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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE

involved a defendant who was a nonresident at the time of execution. It then proceeded to enumerate certain factual circumstances
which tended to indicate a sufficient contact with the state to support the assumption of jurisdiction. 13 However, the issue in
Kochenthal was not whether there were sufficient contacts to constitutionally support jurisdiction, but whether CPLR 30 2(a) (1)
authorized the assumption of jurisdiction by the courts in cases
involving non-commercial transactions of business.
It would seem that, absent a clear declaration of legislative
intent, there is little reason to assume that the word "business"
in the statute was meant to preclude non-commercial transactions.
Substantial negotiations, both financial and otherwise, culminating
in a separation agreement would appear to be transactions of
business within the scope of 302(a)(1).
CPLR 308(3).: Tnterpretation of "usual place of abode:'
In Rich Prods. Corp. v. Diamond,'14 service of process was
made pursuant to CPLR 308(3) by mailing a copy of the
summons, with return receipt requested, and affixing a copy to
the main entrance of defendant's residence in Buffalo, New York.
Defendant moved to vacate service on the ground that he had
changed his domicile to the state of Michigan two days prior
to the first attempt at service, and had not been physically present
in New York since that date. The supreme court, Erie County,
held that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of proof
on the issue of change of domicile as he had not shown that the
out-of-state facilities he had rented were "complete, adequate,
furnished or occupied by him." 15
Defendant relied principally on the fact that he had rented
an apartment on a one-year lease in Michigan which he intended
to make his home; that he had filed a certificate of incorporation
in Michigan; and that he had registered his automobile in that
state. In the face of these allegations, plaintiff's affidavit noted
that defendant was a registered voter in Erie County; that he was
the owner of record of a residence in New York worth approximately $56,000 which was apparently in use at the time of
service; that he was currently listed in the city's directory; that
he was being billed for a telephone at that address; and that he
maintained a checking account at a local bank. It was further
indicated that the defendant had not moved his personalty from
New York to Michigan on the alleged date of his change of
domicile, nor had he done so at any other time.
Id. at 443, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
'd 51 Misc. 2d 675, 273 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1966).
tr Id. at 678, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
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It should also be noted that the defendant had actually
received the mailed summons and thereby had notice of the
prospective litigation. Therefore, the defendant could not defend
on the basis of lack of notice. Moreover, it is apparent that the
defendant had not sustained his burden of proving that the
Buffalo residence was no longer his "usual place of abode" within
the meaning of the statute. Procedurally, Rich has as its salient
feature the fact that the party alleging a change of domicile
will be required to make a substantial showing of a severance
of his ties with New York in addition to the acquisition of
out-of-state facilities.
CPLR 308(4).: Service by publication authorized in
negligence action.
In Deredito v. Winn,' 6 the nonresident defendant was involved
in an automobile accident in New York. Since the defendant's
address was unknown to plaintiff, personal jurisdiction was predicated upon service by publication alone. The appellate division,
second department, unanimously held that:
article 3 of the CPLR does not authorize service by publication
upon . . . nondomiciliary defendants . . . where: (a) no prior attach-

ment of their property in this state has occurred and (b) a finding
could not properly be made that service by publication would give
17
notice to them of the action and an opportunity to defend themselves.
Subsequent to Deredito, the appellate division, second department, handed down the companion decisions of Sellars v. Raye 18
and Dobkin v. Chapman.19 Dobkin. held that due process was
satisfied by service effected by the mailing of the summons to
an address given by the defendant at the scene of an automobile
accident, despite the fact that the defendant no longer resided
there. The Sellars court, under factually similar circumstances,
held that service upon the Secretary of State, plus registered
mail sent to the address supplied by the defendant at the accident,
as well as publication in the vicinity of that address was sufficient.
Dissenting opinions in both Sellars and Dobkin reasoned that there
was no distinction between the facts of Deredito and those of
Sellars and Dobkin, and, therefore, Deredito was controlling.
A recent supreme court decision in the second department,
Gibbs v. BaldZwin,20 has held that service by publication was
1623 App. Div. 2d 849, 259 N.Y.S.2d 200 (2d Dep't 1965).

11
Id. at 849-50, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
18 25 App. Div. 2d 757, 269 N.Y.S.2d 7 (2d Dep't 1966).
1925 App. Div. 2d 745, 269 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2d Dep't 1966).
20 52 Misc. 2d 268, 275 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1966).

